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Digital Computation as Information Processing
Nir Fresco (student)1
Abstract.1 It is common in cognitive science to equate
computation (in particular digital computation) with information processing. Yet, it is hard to find a comprehensive explicit account of concrete digital computation in
information processing terms. An Information Processing
account seems like a natural candidate to explain digital
computation. After all, digital computers traffic in data.
But when ‘information’ comes under scrutiny, this account becomes a less obvious candidate.
‘Information’ may be interpreted semantically or nonsemantically, and its interpretation has direct implications
for Information Processing as an objective account of
digital computation. This paper deals with the implications of these interpretations for explaining concrete digital computation in terms of information processing. To
begin with, I survey Shannon’s classic theory of information, and then examine how ‘information’ is used in
computer science. In the subsequent section, I evaluate
the implications of how 'information' is interpreted for an
Information Processing account. The key requirements
for a physical system to compute are then fleshed out, as
well as some of the limitations of such an account. Any
Information Processing account must embrace an algorithm-theoretic apparatus to be a plausible candidate
for explaining concrete digital computation.

A general account of Information Processing based on
'Shannon information' is outlined here in the context of
concrete digital computation. I begin by surveying Shannon’s classic theory of information in section 2,
and then examine whether Algorithmic Information theory significantly changes the resulting IP account, in the
third section. Subsequently, in section 4, I discuss the
implications of how 'information' is interpreted for explaining concrete digital computation. The key requirements implied by the IP account for a physical system to
perform digital computation are explicated in section 5.
Eventually, in section 6, I examine the limitations of this
account and argue that any IP account must embrace
an algorithm-theoretic apparatus to be a plausible candidate for explaining concrete digital computation.

2. THE RECEIVED THEORY OF INFORMATION IN COMMUNICATION
The most influential theory of information in communication and engineering was introduced by Claude Shannon in 1948. He showed how information could be
transmitted efficiently across communication channels by
means of encoded messages. Shannon [1] attempted to
solve the “fundamental problem of communication”:
finding the optimal manner by which messages from a
source of information are exactly or approximately reproduced at their destination [2]. According to Norbert
Wiener [3], one of the simplest unitary forms of information is the recording of a choice between two equiprobable basic alternatives. A sufficient condition for a
physical system to be deemed a sender or receiver of
information is the production of a sequence of symbols in
a probabilistic manner.
Moreover, Shannon [1] and Wiener [3] analyse an
information-generating system in terms of five essential
components: an information source, a transmitter, a channel, a receiver and a destination. The information source
produces a message to be communicated to the receiver.
The transmitter operates on the message to produce a
signal suitable for transmission over the channel, which is
simply the medium of signal transmission. The receiver
reconstructs the message from the signal. And the destination is the system for which the message is intended.
So communication amounts to the source of information
producing a sequence of symbols, which is then reproduced by the receiver to some degree of accuracy.
Nevertheless, ‘Shannon information’ does not entail
any semantic content or meaning. Shannon’s information
theory approaches information syntactically as a physical

1. INTRODUCTION
According to the Information Processing (hereafter,
IP) account, for a system to be deemed a computing system it needs to process data, which carries information. It
is often assumed, particularly in cognitive science discourse, that symbolic computation models can freely be
described as information processing models. This is the
motivation for this paper, which deals with the question
whether concrete digital computation (i.e., digital computation as it is actualised in physical systems) can be adequately explained solely in information processing terms.
Furthermore, any resulting IP account hinges on the
interpretation of 'information'. It can be interpreted semantically or non-semantically (and more specifically
quantitatively as ‘Shannon information’ or Algorithmic
Information). It is questionable whether an IP account of
computation must presuppose semantic information. The
important question is then whether computing systems
traffic in semantic information inherently, or whether
they traffic in data or non-semantic information, which in
turn could be assigned some meaning by users2.
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phenomenon: whether and how much (not what) information is conveyed [4]. On the other hand, a stronger
sense of 'information' (i.e., semantic information) entails
that messages have specific meanings by representing
how things are or could be.
According to Shannon’s theory, ‘information’ is interpreted in the weaker sense. 'Shannon information’ is different (but not distinct) from the ordinary usage of 'information'; it tells us nothing about the usefulness of or
interest in a message. The basic idea is coding messages
into a binary (or any other) system at the bare minimum
of bits we need to send to get our message across. Even
in this limited sense, the amount of ‘information’ conveyed is as much a property of our own knowledge as
anything in the message. If we send the same message
twice every time (a message and its copy), the information in the two messages is not the sum of that in each.
Rather the information only comes from the first one
(assuming it was successfully transmitted) [5].
The important aspect of ‘Shannon information’ is that
the message is selected from a set of possible messages.
A message, composed of symbols, is a physical structure
discriminated by the probability of selecting it over other
possible messages. So a nonsensical message composed
of the sequence of symbols ‘%3-4Y7@*’ could in essence generate more information than a meaningful message (in the ordinary use of ‘information’) such as
‘daughter’ in reply to some question. This could be the
case, if the message ‘%3-4Y7@*’ would be more “surprising” than ‘daughter’ [2]. Receiving a message containing the former string could change the recipient’s
circumstance from not knowing what something was to
knowing what it is. The more possible messages a recipient could have otherwise received, the more “surprised”
the recipient is when it gets that particular message [5].

that successive messages (e.g., procedures) sent across
the channel can be distinguished from one another. Still
he acknowledges that Algorithmic Information has precisely the formal properties of Shannon's concept of information entropy.
Although Algorithmic Information is underpinned by
classical computability theory, it too is non-semantic and
quantitative as Shannon’s theory. It interprets information
and measures its quantities in terms of the computational
resources that are needed to specify it [4]. Algorithmic
Information measures the length of the shortest algorithm
that computes a string. That algorithm may even be
shorter than the output it produces. For example, representing ! or e in a binary notation [7].
Algorithmic Information then may be deemed a competing notion of 'Shannon information' by allowing us to
assign complexity values to individual strings and other
data types [8]. Whilst Shannon’s theory analyses the
amount of information in a group of messages based on
the probability of the messages, Algorithmic Information
theory analyses the complexity of a string as a single
message. The relative frequency of the message has no
meaning, but there is some shortest program on a UTM
that can produce this message. The length of this optimal
program is an absolute measure for the amount of information in that message. Both Algorithmic Information
and ‘Shannon information’ give rise to optimal compression
codes
for
information. A bit
string
‘01010101010101’ can be compressed in Shannon's sense
as '01'=1;1111111, or can be programmed in the Algorithmic Information sense as for x = 1 to 7 write '01' [8].

4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERPRETING ‘INFORMATION’ FOR THE IP ACCOUNT

3. INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SCI-

Most structural accounts of concrete computation assume
that it is a type of information processing. These accounts
consider the unique structural properties of computing
systems (namely, their digital architectures) to be their
distinctive feature. But in addition to the structural constraint, they also assume a semantic constraint on concrete computation: processing information [9]. Some
connectionists, on the other hand, reject the structural
constraint, and argue that information-processing properties of digital computation differentiate it from other
causal and mechanical processes. On their view, concrete
computation is explained in terms of the information
transformed, represented, and stored in the process of
computing [10].
Still, any current attempt to untangle concrete computation and IP must begin with a distinction between a
weaker sense of ‘information’ (e.g., 'Shannon information' or Algorithmic Information) and semantic information. Using informational language in the stronger
sense raises some problems in regard to concrete computation (e.g., does a computer process semantic information even in the absence of its user? is the meaning of
the computer-processed information intrinsic? if some

ENCE
Shannon’s theory of information is the reigning theory in
communication and can adequately explain network
communication between computers, encoding and decoding of messages, message transmission through data buses or network cables and so on. Algorithmic Information
theory, which was introduced by Andrei Kolmogorov,
Ray Solomonoff and Gregory Chaitin, deals with the
complexity of data structures and can be described as the
borderland where information and digital computation
meet. It formally defines the complexity or the informational content of a data structure (e.g., a string) as the
length of its shortest self-delimiting algorithm running on
a Universal Turing Machine (henceforth, UTM) [6] [7].
The algorithmic information of any computable string is
the length of the shortest algorithm that computes it on a
UTM.
Moreover, Chaitin proposes to think of a computing
system as a decoding device at the receiving end of a
noiseless binary communications channel [6]. Its programs are thought of as code words, and the result of the
computation (i.e., its output) as the decoded message. The
programs then form what is called a “prefix-free” set so
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information processing carries meaning and some does
not, how are they distinguished? etc.).
Even if we interpreted the IP account in Shannon’s
sense, it would be hard to accept it as a satisfactory account of concrete digital computation. Brian Cantwell
Smith [11] argues that since information theory is not a
full analysis of information, it cannot be a solid basis for
a comprehensive account of concrete computation. His
argument relies on a semantic reading of both information [11] and computation [12], and if ‘Shannon information’ is not semantic, it cannot adequately explain
computation. Moreover, Piccinini and Scarantino [2]
maintain that it is not clear how ‘Shannon information’ is
processed. Whether ‘Shannon information' can be associated with a given vehicle does not depend on any specific physical properties. Instead, it is regarded as a selection of symbols from a given language according to the
probability distribution of these symbols. Shannon information does not pertain to individual messages, and individual messages are those that may be created, and manipulated by digital computing systems.
Also, digital computation may be either deterministic
or non-deterministic (e.g., probabilistic computation,
random computation etc.). Still, most digital computing
systems developed in the computer industry are deterministic, since their behaviour is repeatable and systematic. A
dry run of a deterministic algorithm (using some test
data) should systematically yield the same output when
its input and initial state remain unchanged. The statetransitions of Shannon's communication model are probabilistic, whereas the transition probabilities of a Turing
machine (hereafter, TM) are all set to 1. For every possible input, there is only one possible state into which the
TM transitions [13].
Be that as it may, analysing digital computation using
information-theoretic language could be very constructive. Smith [11] asserts that the IP account could indeed
serve as the grounds for a plausibly comprehensive theory of concrete computation. But on his view several theoretical issues must first be addressed. Firstly, only a semantic theory of information stands a chance of doing
justice to computation. Secondly, ‘information’ must be
analysed in a manner that does not entail paninformationalism. Otherwise, this could lead to a dangerous equivocation: if any object can be described in informational terms, then the nature of all objects is genuinely informational. At least prima facie, concrete digital
computation being driven by the executed software seems
most likely amenable to instructional information (e.g.,
do X if Y, otherwise halt) [14].

mation’ affects both the characterisation of the resulting
IP account and the key requirements it implies for computing systems, as will be shown below. The following
discussion remains neutral on the semantic vs. nonsemantic reading of 'information', unless specified otherwise.
The first key requirement implied by the IP account is
the system having the capacity to send information.
Whether ‘information’ is interpreted semantically or nonsemantically, concrete computation requires a source of
information to transmit the data. Regardless of the medium by which the data is transmitted (e.g., via data buses,
network cables, etc.), the sender is responsible for the
data transmission. The sender prepares the messages to be
sent to the receiver and encodes them for transmission.
To emphasise, in computing systems the sender and the
source of information may be distinct entities. For instance, whilst the computer’s main memory could be a
source of information (e.g., a stored instruction), the
memory controller is responsible for fetching the data
from memory and transmitting it to the CPU. The
memory controller acts as the sender, but not as the
source.
Analogously, the second key requirement implied by
the IP account is the system having the capacity to receive information. If the former requirement necessitated
a sender to transmit the message, this requirement necessitates a receiver on the other end to accept it. The absence of a receiver on the other end means that the computation remains unexecuted (or in a suspend mode). For
instance, an instruction, which was fetched by the main
control unit from the memory, but not received by the
receiver (the CPU in this case), will not be executed.
Also, a computer program (the sender), which sends an
input/output signal to the operating system (the receiver),
will enter the suspend mode until its I/O request is
acknowledged.
Furthermore, when construed as information processing, concrete digital computation is at best incomplete in the absence of either a receiver or a sender. Unlike a microphone acting as a sender of information even
in the absence of a receiver (the audience), a computing
system must have both a sender and a receiver that are
well coordinated. The information contained in a message
may indeed not depend on the receiver’s learning something from it, or even being able to decode the message
[15]. But if the receiver is absent or unable to decode the
message in a computing system, the computation will be
either incomplete or incorrect. Suppose that the CPU (the
receiver) is unable to correctly decode the instruction
from the main control unit (the sender), it will fail to
execute the instruction hindering the overall computation.
The third key requirement implied by the IP account is
the system having the capacity to store and retrieve information. Computing systems store and retrieve digital
information, which can be thought of as a series of bits.
The storage and retrieval of information in a computing
system should be well synchronised, as one always presupposes the other. Without the system having the ability
to retrieve the data, there is clearly very little sense to
storing it in the first place.

5. THE KEY REQUIREMENTS IMPLIED
BY THE IP ACCOUNT
The key requirements for a physical system to perform
digital computation implied by the IP account are fourfold: 1. having the capacity to send information, 2. having
the capacity to receive information, 3. having the capacity
to store and retrieve information, 4. having the capacity
to process (or transform) information. The choice between a semantic and a non-semantic reading of ‘infor-
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formative). Let S3 be “Bumblebee is a car”. By using
Universal Instantiation, for example, one can infer some
new justified information3: S4= “Bumblebee has four
wheels” from S1 and S3. This new information must also
be true, if S1 and S3 are true (here enters semantic information again). It tells us something else about Bumblebee
(that Bumblebee has four wheels).
On the other hand, S2 and S3 do not yield new justified
information using Universal Instantiation (similar to S4).
One cannot validly infer any new singular statement
about Bumblebee from the universal statement S2, as
Universal Instantiation does not apply to S3 (for Bumblebee is not a cat). In order to apply rules of logic as a
means of generating new true information, the symbolic
constituents of strings must be distinguishable. But according to Shannon's information theory we may encode
and transmit S2 (rather than S1) and S3 to the recipient
(since S1 and S2 are equiprobable). Yet, the recipient will
have learned nothing new from S2 and S3 in this case.
Furthermore, when ‘information’ is construed semantically (as proposed by some philosophers) its transformation requirement becomes even more stringent. The
syntactical manipulation of messages must be done in a
manner that always preserves their semantics. Typically,
rules that are applied in the transformation process must
be truth preserving4. At the very least, new justified information has to be consistent with prior “known” information. If conjunction, for instance, is applied to add new
justified information, then the conjuncts C1 and C2 must
be neither contradictories nor contraries. Otherwise, their
conjunction ‘C1 and C2‘ would be false.
Likewise, when syllogistic rules are applied in the
process of transforming semantic information, syllogistic
fallacies must be prevented5. For instance, when deductive inference is used to validly infer P3 from the premises P1 and P2 (where P1!P3 and P2!P3), then P3 must be
true to be deemed new (or modified) semantic information. Not only that, but the error detection mechanism
employed by the computing system must be such that it
verifies that every single premise (P1 and P2, in the example above) is true6, even if the deductive argument is
valid. Thus, to extract new semantic information, sufficient scrutiny is required to ensure its truth and coherence. The same principle also applies to other types of

Lastly, the fourth key requirement implied by the IP
account is the system having the capacity to transform
information. This requirement cannot be dismissed, as it
the essence of processing of information. It is also the
most problematic requirement, which becomes even more
stringent when ‘information’ is interpreted semantically
(as will be shown below). It is important to emphasise
that transforming information does not amount to merely
encoding and decoding information. Those are methods
that typically preserve the information while converting it
into a coded form and vice versa, and are useful in the
communication of signals or messages. Transformation of
information is more than that, it is characterised as the
creation (e.g., a new database table containing salaries of
employees), modification (e.g., giving some employees a
pay rise) and destruction of information (e.g., deleting
some records of employees, who left the company, from
the system).
The transformation or processing of ‘Shannon information’ is problematic, because its focus is not on the
content of individual messages. To restate Wiener’s claim
[3], a sufficient condition for a physical system to be
deemed a sender or receiver of ‘Shannon information’ is
the production of messages in a probabilistic manner.
Processing ‘Shannon information’ can be the modification of the state or strings states that may result in changes of the conditional entropies among the states. It can
also be the elimination of possibilities (reduction in uncertainty) represented by a signal or the introduction of
redundancy to offset the impact of noise and equivocation. But again, sending the same message twice (to offset
the impact of noise) does not yield information that is the
sum of that in each. Similarly, elimination of redundancy
does not reduce the underlying informational content that
is conveyed.
Moreover, construing concrete digital computation as
information processing requires more than merely communicating information in a non-deterministic manner.
Telephones (not the voice over internet protocol systems)
are information processing systems, but they are not digital computers [13]. They can be used to transmit information, but they certainly do not compute in any nontrivial sense. Computers do indeed encode, decode and
transmit information, but they also perform tasks with
inferential import (when I try to divide a number by 0, a
good algorithm should yield an error message from the
computing system). Yet, this requires a way of distinguishing the differences between the informational contents of the messages. Shannon’s information provides
the procedures for selecting messages, but it lacks this
capacity [15].
Still, this ability to distinguish between different contents is necessary for modifying or adding new justified
information. Shannon's information theory tells us about
the probabilities associated with symbols from a given
language, but it is indifferent to the content of the messages. For instance, the strings S1 and S2 have the same
length (including that of their symbol constituents), but a
different composition of symbol constituents. S1= “All
cars have four wheels”; S2= “All cats have four ankles”.
Let us suppose that S1 and S2 are equiprobable (so in
Shannon's sense, they are both potentially equally in-

3
There is an ongoing debate regarding information in deductive
inferences. Some, including John S. Mill and the logical positivists, have argued that logical truths are tautologies, and so deductive reasoning does not add any new information.
4
Induction, abduction and non-monotonic logic do not abide by
the same principle, and their application does not guarantee the
truth of any new information that they potentially create. Both
abductive reasoning and non-monotonic logic play an important
role in artificial intelligence and should not be discounted, but
they exceed the scope of this paper.
5
In particular, when interpreting semantic information as being
necessarily true [4] [15] [16].
6
Immediate inferences from categorical propositions, for instance, do not require the same error verification mechanism.
From the categorical proposition ‘no dogs are cats’, we can
immediately infer that ‘no cats are dogs’ by swapping the predicate term and subject term of the original proposition. The truth
of one of them guarantees the truth of the other.
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transformation rules like existential generalisations, universal instantiations, inductive inferences and so on.
Still, digital computation will proceed (or fail) regardless of the truth-value of the information processed by the
computing system. Gricean non-natural meaning of signs
(e.g., three dings of the bus bell indicating that the bus is
full) does not require a correspondence to the state of
affairs in question (e.g., whether the bus is actually full).
In a similar manner, non-natural information may be
processed by the computing system without any correspondence to an external state of affairs. There is always
a possibility that a computing system will produce an
incorrect output as a result of a miscomputation7 (i.e., a
mistake in the computation process due to an error in the
executed algorithm or a hardware malfunction). In that
case, the only viable option is that the miscomputation
misrepresents the state of affairs in question8. But from
the system's “point of view”, this wrong output has no
less (or more) meaning than the correct output (which
might correctly correspond to some state of affairs).
Whether a computation represents some state of affairs or
not is a contingent fact.

Whilst Algorithmic Information is indeed based on
TMs, it is still insufficient as an IP account of concrete
computation. Algorithmic Information theory's interest in
TMs is limited to finding the shortest program that runs
on a UTM and generates a particular string as its output.
But the purpose of Algorithmic Information theory is
simply to measure the amount of information conveyed
by that string or its complexity, rather than being about
that program. So the best one could hope for in relation
to Algorithmic Information explaining a particular procedure is either measuring the information conveyed by that
procedure (as a string) or determining whether it is the
shortest one for generating the output it produces. Yet,
many computer programs running on multitudes of different systems are neither the shortest nor the most efficient for achieving their tasks.
Another challenge for an IP account of concrete computation, which is based on 'Shannon information' or
Algorithmic Information, is identifying miscomputations.
Miscomputations that are the result of a hardware malfunction could be explained by some breakdown of the
communication channel, for example. But other miscomputations resulting from errors by design or a malformed
algorithm cannot be easily explained, since neither Shannon's information theory nor Algorithmic Information
distinguishes messages by their contents.
Arguably, when information is interpreted semantically it must yield knowledge [4] [7] [11] [15] and that implies a further requirement for a semantic IP account of
concrete computation. This additional requirement is that
by processing information the computing system has to
yield knowledge, which is either derived from its user (or
programmer or interpreter) or intrinsic to the system.
Plato defined knowledge as a true justified belief (which
was widely accepted in modern philosophy9). Semantic
information must tell us something true about some state
of affairs, that is, yield knowledge. One option then is
that this knowledge is derivative and used by the knower,
who uses the information produced by the computing
system10. Another option is that this knowledge is intrinsic to the computing system that traffics in information.
The latter option has been challenged by many philosophers [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] and it is not at all
clear that there is compelling evidence to support it.
There is only a limited sense in which a digital computing
system “understands” or “knows” something. A digital
computer understands the semantics of its machine language. This understanding can be attributed to structural
properties of the machine’s architecture and language as
well as causal links between bit patterns, memory addresses, primitive operations etc. Computers manipulate
information that they need not understand, although they
copy it, compare it with other information and change it

6. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE IP ACCOUNT
When ‘information’ is interpreted narrowly the resulting
IP account cannot adequately explain how computation is
executed and how it differs from miscomputation. Any
plausible account of concrete digital computation must be
able to explain Turing computability, for it lays the
ground rules for all existing digital computers as well as
for programming languages. Any account of Turing computability has to at least be able to explain the three key
algorithmic notions of input, output, and procedures. But
an IP account of concrete computation, which is based on
'Shannon Information' or Algorithmic Information, does
not adequately explain those three key notions.
'Shannon information', for one, only makes sense in
the context of a set of potential messages that are communicated between a sender and a receiver and a probability distribution over this set [8]. There is no room for a
probabilistic selection of messages in describing deterministic procedures. There must be a specific set of messages that are selected, encoded and transmitted in the
same order in accordance with the specific steps of the
procedure, regardless of the probabilities associated with
each message (or its symbol constituents).

7
Besides these two types of syntactic miscomputation, there is
also the possibility of a semantic miscomputation relative to
some task domain (e.g., the Roomba indoor cleaning robot that
may malfunction eventually when it operates under abnormal
operating conditions such as an airfield). However, this semantic
miscomputation can also be reduced to either one of the syntactic miscomputations above.
8
There is always also the remote possibility of a double negation. Suppose that the computing system did not correctly represent some state of affairs when the computation was initiated.
But then the system’s miscomputation incidentally results in a
correct representation of that state of affairs.

9

Edmund Gettier [17] has challenged Plato’s widely accepted
view of knowledge as Justified True Belief. He argued that truth,
belief, and justification are not sufficient conditions for
knowledge. He showed that a true belief might be justified but
fail to be knowledge, because the belief might be true by
sheer accident.
10
Indeed, this option is no more problematic than an encyclopaedia yielding knowledge for its readers.
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[24]. This is the basis for an internal meaning of its information processing.
But that does not imply that the computer manifests
any beliefs that are associated with these operations.
Suppose we replace the doorbell with a digital computer
that emits the sounds: “someone is at the door”, only
when someone pushes the door button. When someone
pushes the door button, the computer picks up the information about it, processes it and delivers an output. However, this output is not a belief in someone being at the
door, anymore than the doorbell would have believed that
[15]. Roy Sorensen [25] makes a further distinction between information conveyed by assertions and displays.
When an answering machine utters the sounds: "Mr.
Smith is not at home", it simply displays this message,
rather than assert it. The machine does not believe that
Mr. Smith is not at home (he may even be home). Similarly, when a computer weather program displays a rainy
weather forecast for tomorrow, it does not believe that it
will rain tomorrow, although this output may be based on
a reliable source of information. There is no intrinsic
belief or knowledge in these information-processing systems.

ferent from other non computing IP systems such as telephones or radios.
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